

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 3727

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT THROUGHOUT)

FOR S/P - MICHAEL ARMACOST

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JA
SUBJECT: US-JAPAN PLANNING TALKS

REF: STATE 056881

FOLLOWING IS GOJ PAPER ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND
JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARD THE PRC AND THE USSR. THIS PAPER
REPRESENTS THE PERSONAL VIEW OF A MEMBER OF THE RESEARCH
AND PLANNING DEPARTMENT AND HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY CLEARED
WITHIN THE MINISTRY.

1. CURRENT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

(1) THERE CONTINUES TO EXIST INTENSE RIVALRY BETWEEN
THE PRC AND THE USSR WITH STRONG FEELINGS OF MUTUAL
ANIMOSITY AND REPUGNANCE AGAINST EACH OTHER.

(2) THE RIVALRY, ORIGINATING FROM THEIR HISTORICAL
AND RACIAL BACKGROUND, IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CONFLICT OF
IDEOLOGIES AND OF NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE SPHERE OF
SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY.

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(3) HOWEVER, BOTH COUNTRIES SEEM TO HAVE RECOGNIZED FOR SOME TIME THAT OVER-INTENSIFICATION OF THEIR RIVALRY MIGHT WELL RESULT IN DISADVANTAGE TO THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY AND TO THE EXECUTION OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES, AND THEY MAINTAIN WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS THEIR WORKING STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS.

2. CURRENT STATUS OF JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC AND THE USSR AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY

2.1. RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA

(1) CURRENT SITUATION

(A) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JAPAN-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE (SEPT. 29, '72), THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED, AND THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE NOW ENTERED UPON A PHASE OF CONSOLIDATING THE BASIS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP; THE AIR SERVICES AS WELL AS TRADE AGREEMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CONCLUDED, AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE FISHERIES AGREEMENT AND THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP ARE UNDER WAY.

(B) THE VOLUME OF TRADE AND THE NUMBER OF VISITORS ARE INCREASING; THE TWO-WAY TRADE AMOUNTED TO \$2,014 MILLION IN 1973 AND \$3,289 MILLION IN 1974, THE NUMBER OF VISITORS TO 12,229 IN 1973 AND 15,696 IN 1974.

(2) THE CHINESE POLICY AND ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN

THE PRCE HAS SHOWN ITS POSITIVE WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH FRIENDLY AND STABLE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, AND IS PROMOTING THE CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP.

THE FOLLOWING MAY BE CITED AS CHINA'S OBJECTIVES IN MAINTAINING SUCH ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN:-

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(A) TO PROMOTE GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN AS A PART OF ITS WORLD POLICY IN VIEW OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY;

(B) TO CONTAIN JAPAN'S POTENTIAL THREAT (FOR THIS REASON AND (A) ABOVE, CHINA NOW ACCEPTS THE JAPAN-USA SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.);

(C) TO INTRODUCE JAPANESE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY FOR ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; AND

(D) TO PREVENT JAPAN FROM RECEDING IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD FORMOSA.

2.2. JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

(1) CURRENT SITUATION

(A) SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USSR NEARLY TWENTY YEARS AGO, A CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE; E.G., MORE THAN FIFTEEN MAJOR AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED, INCLUDING THOSE ON FISHERIES, TRADE, AIR SERVICES, CONSULAR AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS; PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' LEVEL HAVE BEEN HELD; THERE HAS BEEN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF VISITORS (19,148 IN 1974).

(B) HOWEVER, WITH THE NORTHERN TERRITORIAL ISSUE STILL PENDING, THERE HAS BEEN AS YET NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY.

(C) TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE STEADILY EXPANDED. (THE TWO WAY TRADE IN 1974 AMOUNTED TO \$2,515 MILLION, WHILE A NEW \$1 BILLION CREDIT WAS EXTENDED IN 1974 FOR THE SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.)

(2) THE SOVIET POLICY AND ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN

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THE USSR HAS SHOWN ITS WILLINGNESS TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, AND HAS RECENTLY ACTIVATED ITS DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES TOWARD JAPAN AS WITNESSED IN THEIR RECENT PROPOSAL TO SHELVE THE NORTHERN TERRITORIAL ISSUE AND TO CONCLUDE A TREATY OF GOOD-NEIGHBORHOOD AND FRIENDSHIP. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE CITED AS THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN MAINTAINING SUCH ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN:-

(A) TO NEUTRALIZE IN THE LONG RUN THE POTENTIAL THREAT FROM JAPAN AS A BIG INDUSTRIAL POWER WITH ITS EXERCISABLE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE AND TO HOLD IN CHECK AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE THE CURRENT ANTI-SOVIET TENDENCY IN JAPAN TO GROW FURTHER;

(B) TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH JAPAN, IN CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE PROSPECT OF
DECREASING US PRESENCE AND INCREASING CHINESE
INFLUENCE IN ASIA;

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FOR S/P - MICHAEL ARMACOST

(C) TO DETER A RAPID PROGRESS OF RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA, FOR FEAR OF A POSSIBLE
SOVIET ISOLATION IN THE EAST ASIA THROUGH A CONTINUED
PROGRESS IN THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AS WELL AS THE
POSSIBLE SINO-AMERICAN ENTENTE IN THE FUTURE;

(D) TO INTRODUCE JAPANESE CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY,
MAINLY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIBERIA.

2.3. THE CURRENT SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY AND ITS POLICY
IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN

THOUGH THE CURRENT SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY HAS ASPECTS
BOTH ADVANTAGEOUS AND DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE JAPANESE
FOREIGN POLICY, THE OVER-ALL BALANCE SEEMS FAVORABLE TO
JAPAN.

(1) ADVANTAGEOUS ASPECTS

(A) AS BOTH THE PRC AND THE USSR VIE WITH EACH

OTHER IN SEEKING BETTER RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, JAPAN STANDS IN A MORE ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND THE USSR.

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(B) DUE TO THEIR RIVALRY, THEIR MILITARY PRESSURE TOWARD JAPAN IS REDUCED.

(C) THE SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT, ESPECIALLY THE APPARENT CHINESE APPROVAL OF THE US PRESENCE IN THE EAST ASIA IS FAVORABLE TO JAPAN.

(D) MUTUAL RESTRAINT BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE USSR IN THEIR ASIAN POLICIES ALLOWS MORE ROOM THAN OTHERWISE FOR JAPAN'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES IN ASIA; SUCH MUTUAL RESTRAINT COULD HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECTS AS CITED IN (2) (A) BELOW, BUT IN GENERAL, IT HAS MORE FAVORABLE EFFECTS ON JAPAN'S STAND.

(E) JAPAN'S DIPLOMATIC MANEUVRABILITY IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL SPHERES IS ALSO ENHANCED.

(F) ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE IN JAPAN, THE OPPOSITIONS' PRESSURE UPON THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY IS REDUCED, BECAUSE OF THE DIVISIVE EFFECT OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY UPON THE LEFTISTS' MOVEMENT IN JAPAN.

(2) DISADVANTAGEOUS ASPECTS

(A) THE RIVALRY AND MUTUAL RESTRAINT MAY TEND TO DESTABILIZE OR IMPEDE STABILIZATION IN EAST ASIA (INDOCHINA AND KOREA), AS THEY LESSEN THE CONTROLLING INFLUENCE OF THE PRC AND THE USSR ON THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED IN THE AREA.

(B) AS BOTH THE PRC AND THE USSR COULD INTENSIFY THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES TOWARD JAPAN RESPECTIVELY IN ORDER TO OBSTRUCT PROGRESS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE OTHER PARTY, EITHER PARTY MIGHT HARDEN ITS ATTITUDE, IF TEMPORARILY, TOWARD JAPAN. IT COULD ALSO COMPLICATE THE JAPANESE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE.

3. FUTURE PROSPECT OF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATINS FOR JAPAN

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3.1. FUTURE PROSPECT

(1) THE FUNDAMENTAL TONE OF SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IS NOT EXPECTED TO CHANGE DRASTICALLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND THE RIVALRY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO EXIST FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

(2) ALTHOUGH ONE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT TENSION COULD RISE HIGHER FROM TIME TO TIME THROUGH THE POSSIBLE RISING OF RADICALS IN CHINA OR OCCURRENCE OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SUCH HIGHTENED TENSION MIGHT FURTHER DEVELOP INTO A LARGE-SCALE MILITARY CONFLICT.

(3) ON A VERY LONG TERM, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE USSR MIGHT DEVELOP INTO A LIMITED COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP, OR A DETENTE, BACKED UP BY A BALANCE IN THEIR DETERRENT CAPABILITIES, WHERE BOTH MIGHT TOLERATE THEIR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND MAKE CERTAIN ADJUSTMENTS OVER THEIR CONFLICTING NATIONAL INTERESTS.

THE FOLLOWING CAN BE CITED AS ELEMENTS WHICH MAY POSSIBLY PROMOTE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT:

(A) AS CHAIRMAN MAO WITH HIS PHILOSOPHY AND ROLES HAS CONTRIBUTED CONSIDERABLY TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, SIGNS FOR IMPROVEMENT MIGHT APPEAR AFTER MAO PASSES AWAY, ESPECIALLY IN THE STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONSHIP.

(B) AS THE CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES IMPROVE AND ACHIEVE A CERTAIN MEASURE OF NUCLEAR BALANCE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING CHANCES OF AN ALL-OUT WAR.

(C) AS CHINA LOSES ITS RADICALISM, BOTH COUNTRIES MIGHT ACCEPT THEIR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES.

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(4) IN VIEW OF THEIR DEEP-ROOTED ANIMOSITY, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FORESEE A SITUATION WHERE THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN (3) ABOVE WOULD FURTHER DEVELOP INTO A STATE OF MILITARY AND

STRATEGIC COOPERATION, I.E., THE SUBSTANTIVE RESTORATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE.

3.2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN

(1) IF THE CURRENT RIVALRY CONTINUES, THE NET EFFECTS ON JAPAN ARE FAVORABLE AS SEEN ABOVE.

(2) IF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WERE TO DETERIORATE, BUT WERE TO REMAIN BELOW THE LEVEL OF A SMALL SCALE OR LOCAL MILITARY COLLISION, THE SITUATION WOULD STILL BE RELATIVELY IN FAVOR OF JAPAN.

(3) IF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WERE TO DEVELOP INTO A DETENTE OR A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS, BOTH ADVANTAGEOUS AND DISADVANTAGEOUS ELEMENTS AS MENTIONED ABOVE MIGHT BE REDUCED, THOUGH JAPAN MIGHT LOSE MORE OF THE FORMER MERITS IN GENERAL RATHER THAN THE LATTER.

4. JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARD THE PRC AND THE USSR

4.1. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

(1) THE CLOSE AND FIRM RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PREREQUISITE FOR JAPAN TO ENSURE ITS OWN SECURITY AND TO CONDUCT EFFECTIVELY ITS DIPLOMACY VIS-A-VIS THE PRC AND THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH JAPAN-US RELATIONSHIP IS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR JAPAN WHEN AND IF JAPAN HAS TO FACE A POSSIBLE SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT.

(2) AS JAPAN IS NOT IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE POSITIVELY UPON THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT JAPAN SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO MINIMIZE ANY POSSIBLE UNDESIRABLE IMPACT THAT IT MAY CAUSE ON JAPAN, CAREFULLY OBSERVING ANY MOVES IN THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS TO

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JAPAN.

(3) IN ORDER NOT TO LOSE ITS ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE PRC AND THE USSR AND ALSO TO STAND IN READINESS FOR ANY POSSIBLE CHANGE IN THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, IT IS IN THE JAPANESE INTEREST TO KEEP GOOD AND STABLE RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE PRC AND THE USSR.

(4) IT IS IMPORTANT FOR JAPAN NOT TO PUT HERSELF IN A POSITION WHICH APPEARS TO BE TOO ONE-SIDED WITH EITHER THE PRC OR USSR OVER A LONG SPAN OF TIME, IN ORDER TO

AVOID A SITUATION WHERE PROGRESS MADE IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE PARTY DETERIORATES ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER.

4.2. JAPAN'S BASIC POLICY OBJECTIVES TOWARD THE PRC

(1) TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL AND STABLE RELATIONS AS WELL AS EFFECTIVE CHANNELS OF DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC; AND

(2) TO PROMOTE COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE PRC, IN VIEW OF ITS FUTURE POTENTIALITIES AS JAPAN'S EXPORT MARKET AND RESOURCES SUPPLIER.

4.3. JAPAN'S BASIC POLICY OBJECTIVES TOWARD THE USSR

(1) TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL AND STABLE RELATIONS AS WELL AS EFFECTIVE CHANNELS OF DIALOGUE WITH THE USSR;

(2) TO SETTLE THE NORTHERN TERRITORIAL ISSUE; AND

(3) TO PROMOTE COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, IN VIEW OF ITS FUTURE POTENTIALITIES AS RESOURCES SUPPLIER.

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